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OVERVIEW
This paper discusses the basics of e-discovery from a Minnesota
perspective. It is divided into seven sections, beginning in Part I
with an introduction that addresses why knowledge of the issues
surrounding e-discovery is important. Part II addresses what is
discoverable and must be preserved. Part III addresses the types of
sanctions that can be imposed for e-discovery misconduct and the
types of misconduct generating those sanctions. Part IV addresses
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the concept of proportionality and Part V addresses cooperation.
Part VI focuses on competent representation on e-discovery
matters; and lastly, Part VII addresses malpractice issues.
I.

INTRODUCTION

While the Information Age arrived more than forty years ago,
and “data compilations” have been discoverable since the 1970
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a significant
portion of the bar is still on the learning curve to understanding
how to handle electronically stored information (ESI) in litigation
or investigation. The purpose of this article is to help demystify the
subject for Minnesota practitioners. It is also the goal of the groups
comprising the Minnesota E-Discovery Working Group, through
this primer and other related articles, to establish a set of best
practices for handling ESI.
The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, in particular
Rule 1.1, require that all practitioners have the requisite legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation to undertake the
1
representation. Since virtually every document today is an
e-document, or generated through the use of an electronic system,
the knowledge required by Rule 1.1 includes knowledge about how
to handle ESI.
Three fundamental points serve as a gateway to understanding
the challenges of ESI. First, ESI has characteristics that differ from
paper documents in several important respects. These differences
include: vastly greater volumes of information, which are easily
transmitted (increasingly on mobile devices); information
maintained on systems that dynamically update or modify the
information; and increased costs and logistical challenges
2
associated with accessing and exporting relevant information.
Second, technologies that generate information are ubiquitous
and constantly changing, so it is imperative to continually refine
and update one’s understanding. It is no longer assumed to be

1.
2.

MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).
See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 2–5 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed.
2007) (listing volume and duplicability; persistence; dynamic, changeable content;
metadata; environment-dependence and obsolescence; and dispersion and
searchability).
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enough to collect e-mail from a few custodians. We must now
endeavor to create active data maps that identify the systems most
likely to hold relevant data. Technology continues to evolve to meet
these changing systems.
Third, because virtually all information is now electronically
generated, a lawyer must either acquire sufficient knowledge of ESI
issues and practices, or retain the requisite talent if one is to fulfill
his or her ethical obligation to represent clients competently. Thus,
it is essential for all attorneys to have a basic understanding of
electronic discovery and the need to engage technical electronic
3
discovery experts when appropriate.
As courts began to decide ESI cases, there were undoubtedly
instances of bad facts making for bad law. However, as the judiciary
has gained experience and understanding, several basic principles
have emerged and gained currency not only in individual court
4
precedents, but also in pilot rules projects. For example, it is now
widely recognized that a party’s obligations in discovery do not
extend to producing every shred of potential evidence. Rather,
leading cases and respected commentators alike emphasize that
electronic discovery requires reasonableness and good faith, just as
5
is the case with paper document discovery. Nevertheless, as
technology continues to evolve, what is actually recoverable and
therefore potentially discoverable also continues to evolve. The
ease with which digital information may be altered, destroyed, and

3. See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20 ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 105A (REVISED) 3 (2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120808
_revised_resolution_105a_as_amended.authcheckdam.pdf (revising Comment [6]
to Rule 1.1 on Competence to state that “a lawyer should keep abreast of changes
in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant
technology” (emphasis added)).
4. See Press Release, S.D.N.Y. Office of the Dist. Court Exec., SDNY
Implements Innovative Pilot Program to Improve the Quality of Judicial Case
Management in Complex Civil Cases (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.nysd.uscourts
.gov/file/news/complex_civil_case_pilot; [Model] Order Regarding E-Discovery in
Patent Cases, E.D. TEX., http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin2/view_document.cgi
?document=22218 (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (clean version of the Model Order).
5. See Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335–36 (E.D. Pa. 2012);
Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 632 n.30 (S.D. Tex.
2010); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 28.
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hidden has given rise to the need for courts to demand that data be
preserved, identified, and produced. What this means in practice is
that courts will be less likely to tolerate either “any and all” requests
6
for information or boilerplate objections to production requests.
In aid of this rule of reason, the courts and the bench-bar
groups promulgating local rules and standards have reinvigorated
the proportionality standards that have been in the rules since
7
1983. Accordingly, courts will become more sensitive to (and
resist) requests that a party do everything possible to locate
potentially relevant information, especially if the cost of complying
8
with the request is disproportionate to the potential benefit.
Another critically important principle that has emerged is that
because some information storage systems are dynamic, and ESI
may be lost through the systems’ normal operation, the location
and identification of ESI should be addressed early in a case. Both
federal and many states’ rules (including Minnesota’s) require that
counsel be prepared to discuss ESI issues during an early “meetand-confer” session with opposing counsel, as well as with the court
9
or supervising agency. Moreover, in accord with the foregoing, the
discovery rules and the courts also expect parties to discuss ESI
issues with a level of transparency sometimes missing in the earlier
days of paper discovery. Indeed, judicial reactions to “hide the ball”
and delay tactics appear as root causes for the overwhelming
majority of the harsher sanctions that have been awarded in
10
electronic discovery cases. Thus, it is now well established that

6. See infra Part V (discussing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253
F.R.D. 354, 358–59 (D. Md. 2008), and characterizing boilerplate objections as
“an obvious violation” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
7. See, e.g., Default Standard for Discovery, Including Discovery of Electronically
Stored Information (“ESI”), D. DEL., http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files
/Chambers/SLR/Misc/EDiscov.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (discussing
cooperation and proportionality); [Proposed] Standing Order Relating to the Discovery
of Electronically Stored Information, SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT
PROGRAM, http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/StandingOrde8_10
.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (emphasizing proportionality, cooperation and
early meet and confers).
8. See generally The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 155 (2013) (explaining the
proportionality rule requirements).
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06(d).
10. See Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 364–65; Steven S. Gensler, A Bull’s-Eye View of
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courts view cooperation between the parties as a key component to
11
any litigation.
A final principle that is fundamental to sound resolution of
ESI issues is that all discovery is bound by relevancy limitations.
12
Thus, under the federal rules since 2000, unless otherwise
ordered, parties may obtain information regarding the claims and
defenses asserted in the action. This rule is narrower than it was
previously, and the amendment signaled that parties “have no
entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are
13
not already identified in the pleadings.” The court may expand
the scope of discovery “for good cause” to any matter relevant to
14
the subject matter in the action. Absent such an order or
modification of the pleadings, however, it would appear reasonable
to confine discovery (and logically, preservation) to information
that is potentially relevant under the pleadings. Therefore, as the
matter continues to evolve, the scope of a litigation hold may need
to be expanded or contracted to effectively address preservation of
15
potentially relevant information.

Cooperation in Discovery, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 363 (2009); The Sedona Conference,
The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009).
The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation has now been endorsed by more
than 100 judges and has been specifically embraced by Minnesota courts.
See MINN. SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 35
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public
/Court_Information_Office/Civil_Justice_Ref_Task_Force_Dec_2011_Rpt.pdf.
The Sedona Conference has also published a series of resources on cooperation
for different constituencies. See, e.g., The Sedona Conference Cooperation Guidance
for Litigators & In-House Counsel, SEDONA CONF. (Mar. 2011), https://
thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/465; The Sedona Conference Cooperation
Proclamation: Resources for the Judiciary, SEDONA CONF. (public comment version
Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Resources for the Judiciary], https://thesedonaconference
.org/download-pub/425.
11. See Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350,
358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 356–58; Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL 3342423, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 5,
2007).
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment).
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 284 illus. iii (2010).
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II. WHAT IS DISCOVERABLE (AND MUST BE PRESERVED)?
The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
sought to address the reality that information is now digital in
nature and must be addressed in its digital form within the context
of litigation. As discussed herein, effective July 1, 2013, the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to also
16
address this concept. The most significant change in the Federal
Rules, which addresses the concept of accessibility of digital
information, is set forth in Rule 26(b)(2). Specifically, Rule
26(b)(2)(B) provides that “[a] party need not provide discovery of
electronically stored information from sources that the party
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or
17
cost.” The rule further provides that a party may make a motion to
compel or for a protective order and that the party opposing
production must then prove their contention that the information
18
is not reasonably accessible due to undue burden or cost. The
court may still order discovery of such information upon a showing
19
of good cause. In addition, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) further provides
that the court may limit discovery upon a finding that “the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can
be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; . . . the party seeking discovery had
ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the
action”; or the burden of the discovery outweighs its benefits
20
(applying a five-factor test).
In Minnesota, the state courts have sought to coordinate their
approach to e-discovery with that taken by the federal judiciary, and
the Minnesota discovery rules were amended, effective July 1, 2007,
to adopt electronic discovery provisions similar to those added to
21
the Federal Rules.
16. The relevant sections of the Federal Rules are provided in the appendix
(as are the changes in the Minnesota Rules). See infra Appendix A.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).
21. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02. The revised MINN. R. CIV. P. 34.01 provides in
pertinent part:
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce
and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on the
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To address the continuing evolution of discovery, the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure were amended again, effective
July 1, 2013, and now more closely follow the federal rules on early
disclosure. Rule 26.01 now requires initial disclosures by the parties
within sixty days of the original date when an answer is due. These
initial disclosures include a description of all documents, including
22
those that are electronically stored.
Likewise, Rule 26.06(c) requires that the parties develop a
discovery plan that includes “any issues about disclosure or
discovery of electronically stored information, including the form
23
or forms in which it should be produced.” Further, the court may
direct a conference be held with the judge pursuant to Rule
26.06(d), which would also include a discussion of any issues

requesting party’s behalf, to inspect and copy, test, or sample any
designated documents or electronically stored information—
(including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound
recordings, images, phono records, and other data or data
compilations stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained—, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through
detection devices into reasonably usable form) . . . .
Likewise, MINN. R. CIV. P. 34.02 provides:
The request may, without leave of court, be served upon any party
with or after service of the summons and complaint. The request shall
set forth the items to be inspected either by individual item or by
category, and describe each item and category with reasonable
particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and
manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. The
request may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored
information is to be produced.
....
Unless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise orders:
(a) A party who produces documents for inspection shall produce
them as they are kept in the usual course of business at the time of the
request or, at the option of the producing party, shall organize them to
correspond with the categories in the request;
(b) If a request does not specify the form or forms for producing
electronically stored information, a responding party must produce the
information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or
in a form or forms that are reasonably usable; and
(c) A party need not produce the same electronically stored
information in more than one form.
22. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01.
23. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(c).
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relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
24
information.
It is important to note that when dealing with electronically
stored information, perfection is not required. What is required is
that counsel conducts an early and methodical survey of their
client’s electronic information systems to enable them to accurately
assess the ESI available and to ensure its preservation, availability,
25
and ultimate collection. The methodical survey should be
conducted early in the representation, performed in a reasonable
manner, and in good faith, so that counsel may participate
intelligently in “meet and confer” conferences and thereafter
address the court in an informed manner concerning electronically
stored information that is potentially relevant to the claims and
26
defenses in the matter.
In conducting the initial survey of the client’s electronic
information systems, counsel should consider many factors,
including that client’s technological landscape. In considering
whether or not potentially relevant electronically stored
information is reasonably accessible and subject to production,
counsel may consider the approaches described by the Sedona
27
commentators.
What follows is a diagram illustrating a decision-tree to aid in
determining what should be preserved (and potentially produced):

24. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06(d).
25. See, e.g., Phx. Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837 (HB),
2006 WL 1409413, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006).
26. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 230 F.R.D. 290, 291–93 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (denying plaintiff’s motion for permission to disclose confidential transcript
because basis for request was not tied to claims or defenses in case and plaintiff
had no independent duty to produce it).
27. See The Sedona Conference Commentary on Inactive Information Sources,
SEDONA CONF. (July 2009), https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/64;
The Sedona Conference Commentary on: Preservation, Management and Identification of
Sources of Information That Are Not Reasonably Accessible, SEDONA CONF. (July 2008)
[hereinafter Commentary on Preservation], https://thesedonaconference.org
/download-pub/66.
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28

The list of the typical sources of ESI and devices on which it
may reside continues to evolve rapidly. The routine e-mail sources
(desktop computer, e-mail servers) have now been joined by a
plethora of mobile devices (smart phones, tablets, etc.) and the
document types that are created using these ever-evolving tools for
creating data and sharing information. It is important to note that
information currently considered reasonably accessible may not

28.

Sedona Conference Commentary on Preservation, supra note 27, at 6 fig.1.
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have been deemed accessible a mere few months prior, and the
same holds true for information that is not deemed reasonably
accessible currently. For example, restoration of a standard format
backup tape was once a complex and expensive endeavor but in
many situations is now considered routine and significantly less
expensive. It is important to remember that as technology
continues to progress at an ever-accelerating pace, the standards
applied must continuously be assessed and adjusted.
III. SANCTIONS
As lawyers continue to struggle with ESI and their obligations
under the Federal and Minnesota Rules, it is imperative to
recognize that courts are increasingly refusing to permit parties to
29
disregard the rules regarding e-discovery. This section first
addresses some examples of litigation tactics that have resulted in
sanctions in other jurisdictions and then addresses and describes
the leading cases on sanctions at both the state and federal level in
Minnesota.
A.

Examples of Sanctionable Conduct

The issuance of sanctions as a result of e-discovery misdeeds
are on the rise and are becoming increasingly common when a
party chooses to utilize a system of recordkeeping that seeks to
conceal rather than disclose relevant records, or makes it unduly
difficult to identify or locate them, rendering a production of
documents and ESI an excessively burdensome and costly
expedition. Indeed, as one federal court in Utah noted when
considering allegations by Dell: “To allow a defendant whose
business generates massive records to frustrate discovery by
creating an inadequate filing system, and then claiming undue
30
burden, would defeat the purposes of the discovery rules.” Thus, it

29. Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 437
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006));
Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 255 F.R.D. 135, 148–50 (D. Del. 2009), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Starbucks Corp. v. ADT Sec.
Servs., Inc., No. 08-CV-900-JCC, 2009 WL 4730798, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30,
2009); Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1193
(D. Utah 2009).
30. Phillip M. Adams & Assocs. L.L.C, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (quoting
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appears that the more electronically sophisticated a party is, the less
leeway it can expect to receive from the court on matters of ediscovery.
It is also unwise to exaggerate the difficulty involved in
retrieving information sought by the opposing party. An example
of how this tactic can backfire is found in Starbucks Corp. v. ADT
31
Security Services, Inc., a case in which the district court noted that a
defendant’s representative “provided exaggerated reasons and
exaggerated expenses as to why [the defendant] allegedly cannot
and should not be ordered to comply with its discovery
32
obligations.” The Starbucks court found that the plaintiff should
not be disadvantaged because the defendant, a “sophisticated”
company, chose not to migrate their e-mails to a much more
functional archival system, and thus the court determined that the
33
e-mails were reasonably accessible and needed to be produced.
In addition to tactics intended to make collection and
production more difficult, or exaggerating the difficulty of
production, parties must analyze whether potentially relevant ESI is
in the possession of a third party. If so, special analysis may be
necessary. For example, if a party has contracted for a cloud-based
e-mail service, counsel will want to understand how accessible the
data are, where they are stored, the time involved in the extraction,
what metadata may be available (if the opponent is seeking
metadata), and what procedures are available for extracting the
e-mail. In addition, as cloud computing resources continue to
expand and become commonplace in the business environment,
this causes an increase in the difficulty of identifying and isolating
relevant data. While courts have yet to address spoliation of
electronic information stored in the cloud, it is likely only a matter
of time before this relatively new data storage option forms the
basis for sanctions.
As noted in Part II above, when dealing with ESI, courts should
not and generally do not expect perfection, and it is inevitable that
sometimes relevant information may be lost through the routine
34
functions of a computer system. On the other hand, when
Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976)).
31. Starbucks Corp., 2009 WL 4730798 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009).
32. Id. at *5.
33. Id. at *6.
34. See, e.g., Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding
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information is destroyed during litigation through culpable
conduct (be it through destruction resulting from bad faith,
intentional conduct, or gross negligence), and the destruction
35
results in prejudice to the requesting party, sanctions are likely.
When there is a showing of culpable conduct, sanctions may range
from issuance of an adverse inference to even, in the most
egregious of cases, terminating sanctions (i.e., dismissal or default
36
judgment).
Where there is no such showing of culpability or extreme
prejudice, the court may enter a remedial order that is not
intended to punish, but rather is intended to correct the imbalance
that may result from the data spoliation, such as additional
discovery, cost-shifting, or other remedies. Not surprisingly, if a
sanction is given, the nature of the sanction is case and fact
dependent.
In Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc
37
of America Securities, L.L.C., a district court ordered sanctions
against the plaintiffs resulting from their negligent and grossly
negligent failure to properly conduct discovery (including failure
to institute a proper litigation hold), which resulted in destruction
38
of electronic and other records. The Pension Committee court

that spoliation sanctions were unwarranted because “CBS’s general policy was to
reuse tapes” and “[n]othing in the record indicate[d] that CBS intentionally
destroyed the tape or acted with bad faith or gross negligence in respect to it”);
Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 41–42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that spolitation sanctions were not appropriate where Yath provided
insufficient support to the claim that the browser history and temporary files had
been intentionally deleted); see also Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that the “district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that an adverse inference instruction was inappropriate” due in part to “the
limited role of the destroyed folders in the promotion process”); Miller v. Lankow,
801 N.W.2d 120, 129 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that a party with a legitimate need
to destroy evidence may do so under certain limited circumstances).
35. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
Am. Sec., L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin, 685
F.3d 135; Cenveo Corp. v. S. Graphic Sys., Inc., No. 08-5521 (JRT/AJB), 2010
WL 3893680, at *15 (D. Minn. June 18, 2010) (awarding $100,000 in sanctions).
36. See In re Hecker, 430 B.R. 189, 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (granting
plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and holding that part of plaintiff’s judgment
against defendant was not dischargeable).
37. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456.
38. Id. at 497.
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ordered the issuance of an adverse instruction and monetary
sanctions, required certain specific additional discovery to be
produced, and explained that “the failure to issue a written
litigation hold constitutes gross negligence because that failure is
39
likely to result in the destruction of relevant information.”
Reliance on Pension Committee, however, should be tempered in
40
view of the contrary result in Chin v. Port Authority. The Chin court
found that the defendant had failed to implement a document
retention policy and as a result, a significant number of highly
41
relevant documents had been destroyed. The plaintiff accordingly
sought an adverse inference due to spoliation; however, the Chin
court denied the motion, reasoning that the defendant’s spoliation
42
was “negligent, but not grossly so.”
Other courts have also emphasized the need for proactive
43
44
preservation. The district court in Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., in
response to a party’s pattern of lackadaisical discovery practices,
issued substantial monetary sanctions, civil contempt fees, and
issued an order requiring the offending party to notify every
plaintiff in future suits for five years of its past discovery
45
transgressions.
B.

Discussion of Leading Cases

In Minnesota, deliberate spoliation (substantiated either
through forensic methods or admission) can result in adverse
46
inference instructions and exclusion of evidence. For example,
39. Id. at 465.
40. 685 F.3d at 161–62.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 143 (finding that failure to implement a litigation hold is not
gross negligence per se).
43. See Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Wilson v. Thorn Energy, L.L.C., No. 08 Civ. 9009(FM), 2010 WL
1712236, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010); Dong Ah Tire & Rubber Co. v. Glasforms,
Inc., No. C 06-3359 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4298331, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008);
Super Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A., No. 3: 06-CV-0271-B,
2008 WL 3261095, at *10–11 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008); In re Intel Corp.
Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 258 F.R.D. 280, 284–87 (D. Del. 2008).
44. No. 2:07-CV-372 (TJW), 2011 WL 806011 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011).
45. Id. at *10–12.
46. See, e.g., Frazier v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 811 N.W.2d 618 (Minn.
2012).
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47

the court in the Minnesota federal bankruptcy case In re Hecker
issued a terminating sanction due to the behavior of the defendant
and his counsel, finding that they acted with a “blatant disregard of
48
the Court’s orders and the discovery rules.”
Generally, courts will look to impose the minimum sanction
necessary to restore balance to the parties. By way of example, the
49
district court in Cenveo Corp. v. Southern Graphic Systems, Inc.,
awarded a party injured by spoliation $100,000 in monetary
50
sanctions, rather than issue an adverse instruction.
It is important to note that the Eighth Circuit established in
Morris v. Union Pacific Railroad that a finding of more than mere
negligence is required before a court issues an adverse inference
51
instruction. The Morris court found that the severity of the adverse
inference instruction sanction requires a finding of bad faith based
on evidence of intent to destroy documents for the purpose of
52
suppressing evidence. The Eighth Circuit in Morris further
cautioned against the indiscriminate use of adverse inference
instructions and held that to justify the issuance of an adverse
inference instruction there must first be a finding of intentional
53
destruction of data “indicating a desire to suppress the truth.” In
so holding, the Eighth Circuit explained that “[t]he adverse
inference instruction, when not warranted, creates a substantial
54
danger of unfair prejudice.”
55
In Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., the district court ordered
sanctions in the form of additional discovery as well as cost shifting.
The Escamilla court found that prejudice was presumed as the
56
spoliation resulted in evidence being irretrievably destroyed. It is
notable that the Escamilla court ordered the spoliation sanction
57
based upon its inherent disciplinary powers, and therefore the
47. 430 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010).
48. Id. at 195 (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. No. 08-5521 (JRT/AJB), 2010 WL 3893680 (D. Minn. June 18, 2010).
50. Id. at *15.
51. Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 900–02 (8th Cir. 2004).
52. Id.; see also Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 460 (8th Cir.
2013); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004).
53. Morris, 373 F.3d at 901 (quoting Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 746).
54. Id. at 903.
55. No. 09-2120 ADM/JSM, 2011 WL 5025254 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011).
56. Id. at *5.
57. Id.
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sanction was not predicated upon a finding of bad faith, as found
58
in Morris.
59
More recently, in Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, decided in
2013, the Eighth Circuit has made clear that in order to give an
adverse inference instruction, the district court must make two
specific findings: (1) bad faith on the part of the party destroying
60
evidence, and (2) prejudice to the other party.
61
the Minnesota Supreme Court
In Miller v. Lankow,
established a three-factor test to determine whether an adverse
62
inference instruction should be given. The court held that the
three factors to consider are:
(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or
destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice
suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a
lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the
opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously
at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the
63
future.
64
In Frazier v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. (BNSF), the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a district court has
considerable latitude in the choice of language used in an adverse
inference instruction. In that case, the district court had stated that
missing blueprints were an “example” of BSNF’s failure to preserve
65
evidence. Thus, BNSF argued that this instruction unjustifiably
expanded the inference that could be drawn beyond just the
66
missing blueprints. The Frazier court affirmed the district court’s
denial of a new trial based on the spoliation instruction, noting that
admissions BSNF’s counsel made indicated that the defendant had
“bungled evidence, engaged in sloppy evidentiary maintenance and
preservation, and that there [had] been a clear and convincing

58. Morris, 373 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2004).
59. 703 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2013).
60. Id. at 461.
61. 801 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 2011).
62. See id. at 132.
63. Id. (quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79
(3d Cir. 1994)).
64. 811 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 2012).
65. Id. at 629.
66. Id.
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67

showing of negligence.” Thus, the court did not address the
threshold for issuing an adverse inference instruction, but rather
only dealt with the considerable latitude of a district court in
choosing the language to be used in such a jury instruction.
In dealing with a spoliation sanction issue in another case, the
68
Minnesota Supreme Court found in Patton v. Newmar Corp. that a
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert
69
testimony due to the destruction of evidence. The Patton court
70
cited to the inherent power of the trial court to impose sanctions.
Once the expert testimony was excluded, the trial court granted
summary judgment, and that ruling was affirmed by the Minnesota
71
Supreme Court.
The decision to issue an adverse inference instruction when
faced with spoliation resulting in significant prejudice to a party is
within the discretion of the court. Recently in the case Multifeeder
72
Technology, Inc. v. British Confectionery Co., the district court
affirmed the magistrate judge’s finding that spoliation had
occurred and that the parties had suffered significant prejudice
resulting therefrom. The district court judge further held that the
magistrate judge’s ordered sanction of $500,000 was insufficient
73
and raised the sanction to $625,000. The magistrate judge had
also ordered the issuance of an adverse inference instruction based
74
upon the finding of bad faith. However, the district court judge
did not specifically address that issue in his subsequent ruling.
At times, the court finds it necessary to issue more severe
sanctions. In the case of Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct
75
Marketing, Inc., the court found that one of the defendants
(Manley Toys) had failed to obey court orders on numerous
occasions related to discovery issues. In light of those violations, the
court not only entered judgment for $362,438 in sanctions, but also

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
538 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 119.
Id. (citing Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993)).
Id. at 120.
No. 09-1090 (JRT/TNL), 2012 WL 4135848 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2012).
See id. at *8–10.
Id. at *3.
No. 09-1091 (JNE/JSM), 2013 WL 449838 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2013).
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ordered a default judgment on certain counts in the complaint.
The court went on to hold that Aviva would submit proof of its
damages, but Manley Toys was not permitted to oppose that
77
submission.
It remains important to note that not every deletion of
78
electronic information will result in sanctions.
IV. PROPORTIONALITY
Courts are endorsing the need for proportionality within the
79
discovery and litigation process. The Federal Rules also speak
explicitly on the need for proportionality and establish a five-part
80
test. Simply stated, discovery requests should be proportional to
the needs of the case, including the importance of the information
sought to resolving the dispute, the dollar amount in controversy,
the resources of the parties, and the importance of the issues at
81
stake. With the exception of the award of costs per Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) or Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
54.04, each party bears its own costs of litigation unless there is a
court order or agreement between counsel regarding cost shifting
or cost sharing.
The amended Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, effective
July 1, 2013, require that factors of proportionality be considered
with respect to the scope and limits of discovery. Rule 26.02(b) of
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure identifies the factors to be
considered when assessing proportionality and provides:
Discovery must be limited to matters that would enable a
party to prove or disprove a claim or defense or to
impeach a witness and must comport with the factors of

76. Id. at *1.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2011); Yath v. Fairview
Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 50 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); see also Miller v. Lankow,
801 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that a party with a legitimate need
to destroy evidence may do so under certain limited circumstances).
79. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364–65 (D. Md.
2008); see Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 689–90 (N.D. Ga. 2009);
Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 31, 2007).
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
81. The Sedona Conference, supra note 8, at 160.
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proportionality, including without limitation, the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery weighed against its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the
82
issues.
The principles of cost shifting and proportionality arise out of the
application of, and interplay between, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) and (C) and their corresponding state
83
rules applicable to electronic discovery issues and disputes. In
addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) and Minnesota
Rule of Civil Procedure 26.07 further underscore the obligation
that attorneys have to ensure that discovery requests are not
promulgated solely to harass, unduly delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of the litigation. These latter provisions also give courts the
84
authority to issue sanctions for discovery abuses.
Proportionality is a principle that appears to have been
neglected by litigators until recently when the costs of e-discovery
have made many wonder, “Is this case worth it?” As earlier stated
herein, the applicable discovery rules allow courts to place limits on
discovery according to the proportionality factors specified in the
rules. In addition, the Sedona Conference developed the following
“Principles of Proportionality” to increase uniformity in how courts
make proportionality determinations:
1. The burdens and costs of preserving of potentially
relevant information should be weighed against the
potential value and uniqueness of the information
when determining the appropriate scope of
preservation.
2. Discovery should generally be obtained from the most
convenient, least burdensome and least expensive
sources.
3. Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a
party’s action or inaction should be weighed against
that party.
4. Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the
analysis of whether requested discovery is sufficiently
82. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b) (emphasis added).
83. See e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b)(2), (3).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.07; Resources for the Judiciary,
supra note 10, at 35.
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important to warrant the potential burden or expense
of its production.
5. Nonmonetary factors should be considered when
evaluating the burdens and benefits of discovery.
6. Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be
85
considered in the proportionality analysis.
There are few cases discussing the application of
proportionality principles to discovery matters, which may be a
reflection of the neglect of the adoption of this principle until the
Minnesota Rules did so. Recently, in Escamilla, the Federal District
Court for the District of Minnesota cited proportionality without
86
much elaboration as the basis for a cost-shifting determination. In
Escamilla, the plaintiff alleged a hostile working environment,
87
constructive discharge, and retaliation. She served document
88
requests specifically seeking the accused supervisor’s ESI. When
such information was not produced, she filed a motion to compel
and sought an order requiring the supervisor and the company to
make the supervisor’s home and work computers available for
89
forensic copying.
The plaintiff argued that ESI on the computers would show
that the supervisor had fabricated documents that had been
90
produced in paper form during discovery. However, one of the
supervisor’s two home computers had been sent to a relative in
91
Mexico. Since the start of litigation, the second computer’s
operating system had been reinstalled and the computer had never
been searched for relevant evidence on the argument that the
92
computer belonged to the supervisor’s wife. Unfortunately, the
company had also failed to search the supervisor’s laptop and a
later forensic analysis by the company’s forensic analysis vendor
93
had not located any relevant documents. The plaintiff then
claimed spoliation of evidence.
85. The Sedona Conference, supra note 8, at 157.
86. See Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09–2120 (ADM/JSM), 2011 WL
5025254, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011).
87. Id. at *1.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *1–2.
90. Id. at *2.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at *2–3.
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The magistrate judge in Escamilla was faced with a number of
discovery issues, including whether to allow the plaintiff’s forensic
expert to perform his own search of the supervisor’s work laptop
and his wife’s computer, and whether to allow a second deposition
94
of the supervisor after the forensic analysis of the computers. The
magistrate judge granted all three requests and defendants
objected on the basis of proportionality, specifically arguing that
the burden and expense of the additional discovery outweighed the
benefit of the additional deposition and the expert forensic
95
analyses of the two computers. Upon review of the magistrate
judge’s order, the district court determined, citing The Sedona
Conference Commentary on Proportionality in E-Discovery, that the
supervisor had “self-inflicted” the burden by reinstalling the
operating system and, therefore, was not entitled to shift the cost of
96
restoring and searching the computer’s data.
V. COOPERATION
Cooperation and proportionality go hand in hand and are
often discussed together. In a more fulsome analysis of the
proportionality principle in e-discovery, Magistrate Judge Paul
Grimm, a frequent lecturer and writer on e-discovery issues, wrote a
lengthy decision expounding on the centrality of cooperation and
97
proportionality in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co. The
plaintiff in Mancia had served extensive document requests seeking
everything related to the relationship between the plaintiffs and the
98
defendant. The defendant provided boilerplate objections. The
Mancia court stated that these objections were “an obvious
violation” of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 33(b)(4), which
requires that grounds for objecting to discovery requests be stated
99
with specificity, or else they are waived. The Mancia court then

94. Id. at *2.
95. Id. at *3.
96. See id. at *5–6 (citing The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference
Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289, 298
(2010)).
97. 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008).
98. Id. at 355–56.
99. Id. at 356.
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expounded at length on the topics of cooperation and
proportionality in discovery, explaining:
One of the most important, but apparently least
understood or followed, of the discovery rules is Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(g), enacted in 1983. The rule requires that
every discovery disclosure, request, response or objection
must be signed by at least one attorney of record, or the
client, if unrepresented. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). . . . If a
lawyer or party makes a Rule 26(g) certification that
violates the rule, without substantial justification, the
court (on motion, or sua sponte) must impose an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees, caused by the
100
violation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3).
In the Mancia decision, Judge Grimm went on to identify several
rules that should guide the manner in which discovery was to be
conducted, as well as ensure cooperation. He articulated the rules
as follows:
First, the rule is intended to impose an “affirmative duty”
on counsel to behave responsibly during discovery, and to
ensure that it is conducted in a way that is consistent “with
the spirit and purposes” of the discovery rules, which are
contained in Rules 26 through 37. It cannot seriously be
disputed that compliance with the “spirit and purposes” of
these discovery rules requires cooperation by counsel to
identify and fulfill legitimate discovery needs, yet avoid
seeking discovery the cost and burden of which is
disproportionally large to what is at stake in the litigation.
Counsel cannot “behave responsively” during discovery
unless they do both, which requires cooperation rather
than
contrariety,
communication
rather
than
confrontation.
Second, the rule is intended to curb discovery abuse by
requiring the court to impose sanctions if it is violated,
absent “substantial justification,” and those sanctions are
intended to both penalize the noncompliant lawyer or
unrepresented client, and to deter others from noncompliance. As the Advisory Committee’s Notes state,
“Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanctions

100. Id. at 357; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s notes (1983
amendment).
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on attorneys who abuse the discovery rules, Rule 26(g)
makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose
appropriate sanctions and requires them to use it. This
authority derives from Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the
court’s inherent authority.”
Third, the rule aspires to eliminate one of the most
prevalent of all discovery abuses: kneejerk discovery
requests served without consideration of cost or burden to
the responding party. . . . The rationalization for this
behavior is that the party propounding Rule 33 and 34
discovery does not know enough information to more
narrowly tailor them, but this would not be so if lawyers
approached discovery responsibly, as the rule mandates,
and met and conferred before initiating discovery, and
simply discussed what the amount in controversy is, and
how much, what type, and in what sequence, discovery
should be conducted so that its cost—to all parties—is
101
proportional to what is at stake in the litigation.
By signing pleadings, counsel agrees to abide by the rules of
proportionality and cooperation, as the act of signing is meant to
certify that the pleadings are “neither unreasonable nor unduly
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior
discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
102
importance of the issues at stake in the action.”
The Mancia court then reordered the parties to cooperate to
determine what was “at stake,” i.e., what the maximum amount was
103
that the plaintiffs could recover in wages and attorney’s fees. With
this number, the court would then be able to determine the
“amount in controversy” in order to perform a Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
proportionality analysis and to “quantify a workable ‘discovery
budget’ that [was] proportional to what [was] at issue in the
104
case.”
Courts have explicitly endorsed the doctrine of cooperation
within discovery. Cooperation is predicated upon both parties
understanding the relative value of the case as balanced against the
costs of litigation. With discovery being the single largest expense

101.
102.
103.
104.

Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357–58 (citations omitted).
Id. at 358 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii)).
Id. at 364.
Id.
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within litigation, it is essential that all parties acknowledge the
importance of undertaking an early consideration of the issues
105
involving proportionality.
One of the jurisdictions in which
district court judges have been the most prolific in their rulings in
the area of electronic discovery is the United States District Court
106
for the Southern District of New York. In an effort to further
refine their treatment of electronic discovery issues, the Southern
District of New York created a framework for the treatment of
107
discovery issues.
In September 2011, the Federal Circuit Advisory Counsel, led
by Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Randall Rader,
adopted a Model Order governing e-discovery in patent cases in
order to “aid trial courts in the exercise of their discretion in
crafting orders tailored to the facts and circumstances of each
108
case.” The Federal Circuit Advisory Council explained that its
goal was “to promote economic and judicial efficiency by
streamlining e-discovery, particularly email production, and
requiring litigants to focus on the proper purpose of discovery—
the gathering of material information—rather than permitting
109
unlimited fishing expeditions.” Some of the more significant
provisions of the Model Order include:
 Limitations on when and how e-mail productions can be
requested including only after the parties have engaged in
“core” discovery.

105. Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 10, at 18–19.
106. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
Am. Sec., L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port
Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012); Wilson v. Thorn Energy, L.L.C., No. 08 Civ.
9009(FM), 2010 WL 1712236 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010); Aguilar v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Veeco
Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 983987
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
107. See Press Release, S.D.N.Y. Office of the Dist. Court Exec., supra note 4.
108. See Model E-Discovery Order Adopted by the Federal Circuit Advisory Counsel,
FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2011/model-e-discovery-order-adopted
-by-the-federal-circuit-advisory-counsel.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).
109. Fed. Circuit Advisory Council, An E-Discovery Model Order, FED. CIRCUIT 2,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/
Ediscovery_Model_Order.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).
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Presumptive limitations for e-mail production requests,
including on the number of custodians (up to five), keyword
search terms for each custodian (up to five), and the relevant
time frame for culling purposes.
 Cost shifting to the party requesting disproportionate
production requests.
 Limitations on the production of certain metadata in the
110
absence of a showing of good cause.
Following the lead of the Federal Circuit Advisory Council, in
February 2012, the Eastern District of Texas amended its local rules
to include as Appendix P its own Model Order Regarding
111
E-Discovery in Patent Cases. The Eastern District of Texas’s
Model Order is a modification of the Federal Circuit Advisory
Council’s Model Order, and the General Order includes a redline
strikeout version that depicts and explains the specific changes
112
made to the Federal Circuit Advisory Council’s Model Order.
Below is a list of some recommended strategies for courts to
consider in order to encourage the concepts of cooperation and
proportionality in connection with e-discovery:
 Direct the parties to discuss proportionality in the meet-andconfer process and to include in the discovery plan estimates
of the cost of responding to particular requests for discovery of
ESI in comparison with the reasonable ranges of outcomes of
the action.
 Require attorneys to develop discovery budgets with the
approval of their clients.
 Issue scheduling orders with the assistance of counsel (and, as
appropriate, the parties) that allow only discovery
proportionate to the reasonable range of outcomes.

110. Id. add. at 2–4 (discovery model order).
111. See General Order 12-6: General Order Amending Local Rules, app. at
15–20 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2012), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi
-bin/view_document.cgi?document=22217.
112. See id. app. at 15–19; [Model] Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases,
supra note 4 (clean version of the Model Order). For a detailed discussion of the
two Model Orders, see Gilbert Andrew Greene & Daniel Scott Leventhal, Eastern
District of Texas Addresses E-Discovery in Patent Cases in Local Rules Update, NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/us
/knowledge/publications/93481/eastern-district-of-texas-addresses-e-discovery-in
-patent-cases-in-local-rules-update.
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Limit e-discovery in the first instance to ESI that can be
produced by least expensive means and that is most likely to
produce relevant information.
 Use the judicial management strategies described above to
determine whether and when further discovery should be
allowed.
 Appoint third parties such as neutral experts or special masters
to assist the court, if necessary, given the nature of a particular
action or as agreed by the parties, to monitor discovery and
ensure that proportionate discovery is conducted.
 Consider phasing discovery to encourage cooperation and
reasonable disclosure.
There are a myriad of other cases and articles addressing these
issues. Obviously, there is no hard and fast rule, and the inquiry
113
remains factually based involving a case-by-case determination.
VI. COMPETENT REPRESENTATION IN E-DISCOVERY
As noted at the outset of this article, the issues that arise in
electronic discovery are evolving as rapidly as the technology.
Nonetheless, the basic rules of civil procedure and conduct of
discovery still control the landscape, as well as consideration of all
ethical mandates. It is no longer acceptable to abdicate all
responsibility for electronic discovery to litigation support staff.
The decisions that are inherent in the process of electronic
discovery require the expertise and judgment of attorneys. By
taking an active and meaningful role in the process, attorneys can
best protect and represent the interests of their clients and ensure
that their handling of electronic discovery conforms to all
applicable rules of professional conduct. Minnesota Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
114
reasonably necessary for the representation.”
It is important to note that the competency requirement is
held by counsel and cannot be abdicated to support staff. Counsel
must possess enough knowledge to be able to effectively supervise

113.
114.

See infra Appendix B for further resources.
MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).
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those that they oversee. This obligation has also been explicitly
extended to the handling of metadata in documents by the
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Opinion
115
No. 22.
The ABA’s recently adopted comment to Rule 1.1 regarding
competence states, “To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill,
a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,
including the benefits and risks associated with technology, engage in
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal
116
education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”
Further, Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4
establishes similar, although not identical obligations to those
established under ABA Rule 3.4 regarding access to evidence and
documents. Minnesota Rule 3.4 states that a lawyer shall not
“unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or
117
assist another person to do any such act.”
The clear mandate as articulated by both the Federal and the
Minnesota Rules establishes that counsel can no longer take a
passive approach to e-discovery. The rules require that all counsel
understand technology to the extent necessary to effectively
advance their clients’ interests.
VII. MALPRACTICE ISSUES
The law regarding malpractice cases for e-discovery missteps is
just beginning to develop. We can expect to see cases, however, as
more decisions are issued about the failure to issue litigation holds
and preserve relevant data. Cases addressing an attorney’s failure to
properly supervise preservation of ESI and properly respond to
requests for e-discovery could, under the right circumstances, be
negligent and conceivably could form the basis for a malpractice
118
claim.
Professional negligence may result from acts of

115. See Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 22 (2010), available at
2010 WL 7378367 (discussing a lawyer’s ethical obligations regarding metadata).
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2011) (emphasis added).
117. MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a).
118. See, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, J-M Mfg. Co. v. McDermott Will & Emery, No.
BC462832 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 2, 2011), 2011 WL 2296468 (providing an
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commission as well as acts of omission. Actions such as instructing a
client to alter their social media site, failing to handle data in a
manner that insures preservation of metadata, exaggerating the
119
costs of collection of data, and many other actions could well give
rise to claims of malpractice. Failing to give a client clear direction
to preserve data can be just as culpable as advising a client to
destroy data, and both acts may leave counsel vulnerable to claims
120
of malpractice. Thus, it is important for practitioners to be well
versed in the ever-changing world of e-discovery.
VIII. CONCLUSION
E-discovery is technology driven, and as technology evolves, so
does e-discovery. Nevertheless, and despite the ever-changing
landscape, every lawyer handling litigation must have a familiarity
and skill in dealing with ESI and e-discovery. Courts are less and
less willing to be sympathetic to the tired refrain that a lawyer or
party did not understand what was required. And courts in
Minnesota have imposed a variety of sanctions in various cases in
their efforts to force parties and litigants to learn the e-discovery
basics. Thus, the establishment of and adherence to best practices
in this area will aid both the bench and the bar.

example of where a client asserted claims for legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty regarding improper production of privileged electronic
documents).
119. See Starbucks Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 08-cv-900-JCC, 2009 WL
4730798, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009).
120. See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 255 F.R.D. 135 (D. Del.
2009) (“[B]ecause the document retention policy was discussed and adopted
within the context of Rambus’ litigation strategy, the court [found] that Rambus
knew, or should have known, that a general implementation of the policy was
inappropriate because the documents destroyed would become material at some
point in the future.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(noting that “Attorney Johnson advised Rambus to initiate” a document retention
policy that required Attorney Vincent to conform outside counsel’s patent files in
a way that resulted in the destruction of some of the prosecuting attorney’s
documents without providing Vincent “with guidelines . . . as to what sorts of
documents to discard”), vacated, 645 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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APPENDIX A
MINN. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (Competence):
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B–C):
(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party
need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery
or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought
must show that the information is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court
may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the
discovery.
(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must
limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by
these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note (1983 amendment)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted):
Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty to engage in pretrial
discovery in a responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and
purposes of Rules 26 through 37. In addition, Rule 26(g) is designed
to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of
sanctions. The subdivision provides a deterrent to both excessive
discovery and evasion by imposing a certification requirement that
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obliges each attorney to stop and think about the legitimacy of a
discovery request, a response thereto, or an objection. . . .
If primary responsibility for conducting discovery is to
continue to rest with the litigants, they must be obliged to act
responsibly and avoid abuse. With this in mind, Rule 26(g), which
parallels the amendments to Rule 11, requires an attorney or
unrepresented party to sign each discovery request, response, or
objection. . . .
Although the certification duty requires the lawyer to pause and
consider the reasonableness of his request, response, or objection, it is not
meant to discourage or restrict necessary and legitimate discovery.
The rule simply requires that the attorney make a reasonable
inquiry into the factual basis of his response, request, or objection.
The duty to make a “reasonable inquiry” is satisfied if the
investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions
drawn therefrom are reasonable under the circumstances. It is an
objective standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11. . . .
....
Concern about discovery abuse has led to widespread
recognition that there is a need for more aggressive judicial control
and supervision. Sanctions to deter discovery abuse would be more
effective if they were diligently applied “not merely to penalize
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction,
but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the
absence of such a deterrent.”
MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02 (emphasis added):
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
....
(b) Scope and Limits. . . .
....
(2) . . . A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a
protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought
must show that the information is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made,
the court may nonetheless order discovery from such
sources if the requesting party shows good cause,
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considering the limitations of Rule 26.02(b)(3). The court
may specify conditions for the discovery.
(3) . . . The frequency or extent of use of the discovery
methods otherwise permitted under these rules shall be
limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought;
or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues. The court may act on its own initiative
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under rule
26.03.
On February 4, 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued an
order adopting amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure and the General Rules of Practice relating to the Civil
Justice Reform Task Force. These changes were effective on July 1,
2013 and are available at: Order Nos. ADM10-8051, ADM09-8009,
ADM04-8001, Order Promulgating Corrective Amendments to the
Rules of Civil Procedure (Minn. Feb. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Clerks_Office
/Rule%20Amendments/2013-02-12%20Order%20Corrective
%20Amendments%20Civ%20Proc%20pdf.
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The Sedona Conference Commentary on: Preservation, Management and
Identification of Sources of Information That Are Not Reasonably
Accessible, SEDONA CONF. 12 tbl.2 (July 2008), https://
thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/66:
Accessibility Factors
Factors
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Transient
complexity

8

Hidden complexity

9
10
11
12

Examples

Hard drives, PDAs, network storage
Robotic storage devices such as optical disks
Removable optical disks or magnetic tape media which
can be labeled and stored in a shelf or rack
Sequential access devices typically not organized for
Backup tapes
retrieval of individual documents or files
Physically damaged Damaged CDs or DVDs that cannot be read by an
ordinary drive or damaged hard drives and tapes
media
Difficult or impossible to locate a compatible drive or
Legacy media
device to read the typically “orphaned” legacy media
Active on-line data
Near-line data
Offline
storage/archives

Extraction
complexity
Preservation
complexity
Search complexity
Dispersion
complexity
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Web pages constantly being deleted and overwritten to
make room for further storage
Deleted files after recycle bin has been emptied which
cannot be viewed without specialized knowledge or tools
Data fragments found in the slack space which are
difficult to copy
Cache and temp files created by a PC difficult to
preserve without disabling operating system
Static graphical images not OCR’d
Numbers of PDA devices needed to be reviewed for
preservation of data from a central synchronized
location
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APPENDIX B
Cases:


Cost shifting: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake III),
216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).



Spoliation: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake IV), 220
F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).



Sanctions for spoliation: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C.
(Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).



Document preservation: Compare Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135,
161–62 (2d Cir. 2012), which found that the approach in Orbit
One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) to consider the failure to adopt good
preservations practices was one factor in determining whether
sanctions should issue is “the better approach,” with Pension
Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), which
held that the sanctions were justified because the plaintiffs
failed to “act diligently and search thoroughly after they
reasonably anticipated litigation” and the duty to preserve
electronic records had been triggered. See also Rimkus
Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).

Resources:


The Sedona Conference,
https://thesedonaconference.org/publications.



The Sedona Conference Commentary on: Preservation, Management
and Identification of Sources of Information That Are Not
Reasonably
Accessible,
SEDONA
CONF.
(July
2008),
https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/66.



The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 155
(2013).



The Sedona Canada Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic
Disclosure & Discovery, SEDONA CONF. (Oct. 2010),
https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/468.
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The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation: Resources
CONF.
(Aug.
2011),
for
the
Judiciary,
SEDONA
https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/425.



Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations:
By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 (2010).



Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-Shifting in ESI
Discovery Disputes: A Five Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set
Party Expectations, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 569 (2009).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

35

